


















Earlier studies estimating the demand for local public services by means of the median voter 
model have typically assumed  exogenous regressors and static set-ups. Furthermore, the 
commonly used log-linear specification of the demand function has in most cases not been 
supported by a well-defined maximisation problem. In this paper, we investigate whether it 
is important to control for endogeneity and dynamics in empirical work. Using a panel of 
266 Swedish municipalities over the period 1981-1987, our test results show that the 
regressors are endogenous and that the adjustment process is potentially sluggish. We get 
significantly lower price- and income elasticities when we control for endogeneity and 
dynamics. In addition, when we control for endogeneity and dynamics, we can no longer 
reject the hypothesis that observed behaviour can be rationalised by a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. This implies that the log-linear specification of the demand function is valid as long 
as appropriate econometric techniques are used.  
 
 
Keywords: Local public goods, Median voter, Panel data, Endogeneity, Sluggishness 
JEL Classification: C33, D72, H72 
                                                             
† We are grateful for comments from Sören Blomquist, Peter Fredriksson, Nils Gottfries, Eva Johansson, 
Magnus Wikström, and seminar participants at University of Bonn, Uppsala University and at the 1999 
European Public Choice Society Meeting in Lisbon. Matz Dahlberg gratefully acknowledges financial support 
from HSFR. Both authors can be reached at the following address: Department of Economics, Uppsala 
University, PO Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden.  E-mail: Matz.Dahlberg@nek.uu.se, 
Johanna.Jacob@nek.uu.se   2
1. Introduction 
One of the most commonly used methods to analyse political decision-making is the median 
voter model (see Hotelling (1929), Bowen (1943), Downs (1957), and Black (1958)). Though 
building on quite strong assumptions, such as single peaked preferences, a single decision to 
vote on, and single majority voting, the model has proven to be a fruitful tool in the sense that it 
allows the investigator to take the model to data. Ever since the influential papers by Barr and 
Davis (1966) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), the median voter model has been the most 
frequently used method for estimating preferences for local public services.
1 However, recently 
the empirical work on estimating preferences for local public services by means of the median 
voter model has been under attack.  
 
First, it has been criticised for inappropriate model specifications because dynamics have been 
neglected (see, e.g., Bailey and Connolly (1998)). Since most earlier work has used cross 
sectional data, the model specifications have, by their very nature, been static. There are 
however reasons to believe that the adjustment to changes in demand might be sluggish, not the 
least due to hiring and firing costs (Bailey and Connolly (1998) point out some other reasons 
why a dynamic approach would be more valid than the static set-up typically used). There is 
also ample empirical evidence that the adjustment process is quite sluggish in the local 
government sector, see, e.g., Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1989) and Holtz-Eakin and Rosen 
(1989, 1991) on US data, Borge and Rattsø (1993, 1996) and Borge, Rattsø & Sørensen (1996) 
on Norwegian data, and Bergström, Dahlberg & Johansson (1998) and Dahlberg and Johansson 
(1998, 2000) on Swedish data.  
 
Second, the empirical work has been criticised for inappropriate econometric techniques and 
lack of appropriate econometric tests (see, e.g., Becker (1996) and Bailey and Connolly 
(1998)). The argument goes that most of the right hand side variables might be endogenous, due 
to migration or other factors. These are assumed away theoretically, but if there exists for 
example Tiebout-related migration, the median income and the tax price as well as the 
demographic structure might be endogenous. In addition, intergovernmental grants might be 
endogenous since they often are functions of local government spending (see, e.g., Islam and 
                                                             
1 It can be worth mentioning that even though it is hard to rigorously test the median voter model since there 
does not exist any clear alternative hypothesis, there is some evidence in favour of the median voter hypothesis 
to be found in, e.g., Pommerehne (1978), Inman (1978), Turnbull & Djoundourian (1994), and Aronsson & 
Wikström (1996).   3
Choudhury (1990) and Becker (1996)). If dynamics and endogeneity are important to control 
for, most earlier work suffer from biased and inconsistent results. 
 
Furthermore, the theoretical underpinning of the typical log-linear demand function is 
questionable since most empirical evidence implicitly rejects the underlying utility function 
when one exists (see, e.g., the results in Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and Pommerehne 
(1978)) and some often used specifications of the demand function do not even have a well-
defined utility function (see Section 2 for further discussion about this). 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether endogeneity and dynamics are important to 
control for in empirical work and to test the hypothesis that observed behaviour can be 
rationalised by a well-defined maximisation problem.  
 
We find that all the important regressors are endogenous and that the adjustment process is 
potentially sluggish. When we neglect endogeneity and sluggishness and estimate a log-linear 
model with the fixed effects estimator, we have to reject the hypothesis that observed behaviour 
can be rationalised by the maximisation of a Cobb-Douglas utility function. However, when we 
control for endogeneity and dynamics, we can no longer reject the restrictions imposed on the 
demand function by the Cobb-Douglas utility function. This means that it seems to be valid to 
use a log-linear specification of the demand function as long as appropriate econometric 
techniques are used. Furthermore, when comparing our results, when endogeneity and dynamics 
are controlled for, to those obtained when endogeneity and dynamics are neglected, we get 
significantly lower price- and income elasticities. This result indicates that the estimated 
elasticities might be upward biased in earlier studies where static set-ups and exogenous 
regressors have been assumed. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model 
and Section 3 contains a brief presentation of the data set. Section 4 describes the econometric 
method and Section 5 presents our empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
   4
2. Theoretical Model 
Let us first begin by specifying the median voter model within a system of income taxes.
2 Let 
i M =1,...,  denote municipalities and  t T =1,...,  time periods. The preferences of the median 
voter are captured by the quasi-concave utility function 
 
( ) it it it e C U U , = ,            (2.1) 
 
where  it C  is a composite private good (with a price normalised to one) and e E N it it it =  is per 
capita local public provision of a private good. The median voter maximises the utility function 
subject to two budget constraints, his or her individual budget constraint and the municipality’s 




it it it y t C - = 1 ,            (2.2) 
 
where  tit  is the local tax rate and  yit
m is the median voter’s (before tax) income. The 
municipality’s budget constraint is given by 
 
t N y G E it it it it it + = ,            (2.3) 
 
where  Nit  is the number of inhabitants in municipality i in period t,  yit  is the mean individual 
(before tax) income, and Git  is intergovernmental grants received by the municipality
3. Solving 
(2.2) for the local tax rate, and substituting into (2.3) yields 
 
( ) it it it
m








=  is the tax price paid by each median voter and git  is intergovernmental grants  
                                                             
2 This is the proper specification for Sweden since approximately 99% of the taxes raised at the municipal level 
come from income taxation.  
3 During the 1980’s specific grants constituted the major part of intergovernmental grants in Sweden. There 
existed many different kinds of specific grants. (In 1990 there existed over 100 such grants.) Following 
Aronsson & Wikström (2000), we assume that the specific grants are lump sum. A minor part of the 
intergovernmental grants were aimed at helping the municipalities with small per capita tax bases (tax 
equalization grants). For simplicity we assume that these grants are lump sum as well.   5
per capita. Substituting (2.4) into (2.1) yields the following maximisation problem 
 
( ) [ ] max ,
e it
m
it it it it
it
U U y g e e   = + - t .        (2.5) 
 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function, eq. (2.5) is re-written as  
 
( ) ( ) max
e
it it it it
it
g e e  U = A yit
m + - t
q q 1
2 .       (2.6) 
 
The maximisation problem (2.6) yields the following log-linear demand function for municipal 
expenditures 
 
( ) it it it
m
it it g y e t t
q q
q
ln ln ln ln
2 1







= .      (2.7) 
 
The demand function most frequently used in earlier empirical work has typically been of the 
form  
 
( ) it it it
m
it it g y e t y t y y ln ln ln 2 1 0
* + + + = .      (2.8) 
 
A problem is though that the only utility function that is globally consistent with the log-linear specification 
given in (2.8) is the Cobb-Douglas with price- and income elasticities equal to one (i.e., with y1 1 =  and 
y2 1 = - ) (see Rubinfeld (1987)). This is not explicitly discussed in earlier papers, but an examination of the 
obtained results reveals that the log-linear specification is clearly rejected in most applications since the price- 
and income elasticities typically differ from one (see, e.g., Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Pommerehne 
(1978) or Inman (1979) where results from several studies are summarized). In the empirical part of the paper, 
we will estimate a statistical specification of equation (2.8) and test whether observed behaviour is in 
accordance with the behaviour postulated in the maximisation problem (2.6) (that is, we will test the null 
hypotheses that y1 1 =  and y2 1 = - ).
4 
                                                             
4 In the model outlined here, it is assumed that income from grants will have the same impact on municipal 
spending as income from tax revenue. Potential flypaper effects have made several researchers to estimate 
separate coefficients for grants and median income in the log-linear specification (see, e.g., Becker (1996) and 
Turnbull & Djoundourian (1994)). That is however not a valid re-specification of the model since 
( ) it it
m
it g y t y + ln 1  is not equal to 
it it
m
it g y t y y ln ln 12 11 + . The latter specification is, as long as grants are not 
equal to zero, not supported by any utility function.   6
 
 
Accounting for dynamics 
As noted above, some  earlier studies in the literature on local public expenditures indicate 
some kind of dynamic behaviour of local governments (see, e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al. and Holtz-
Eakin & Rosen (1989, 1991) on US data, Bergström  et al. (1998) and Dahlberg & Johansson 
(1998, 2000) on Swedish data, and Borge & Rattsø (1993, 1996) and Borge et al. (1996) on 
Norwegian data).
5 We introduce dynamics by combining the static median voter model with a 
partial adjustment rule. The dynamic formulation separates between the desired l evel of 
expenditures ( ) eit
*  and the actual level of expenditures ( ) eit  for each year. The desired level of 
expenditures is determined by equation (2.8). The relationship between the desired and the 
actual level of expenditures is formulated as a partial adjustment process. The actual change 




1 ln ln ln ln - - - = - it it it it e e e e l .        (2.9) 
 
The adjustment coefficient  l  indicates the sluggishness of the local government responses to 
changing demand. A small value of the coefficient means that only a small fraction of the 
desired change in expenditures is implemented in the first year.  
 
Substituting (2.8) into (2.9) yields 
 
( ) ( ) 1 2 1 0 ln 1 ln ln ln - - + G - + G + G = it it it it
m
it it e g y e l t t ,    (2.10) 
 
where  0 0 ly = G ,  1 1 ly = G , and  2 2 ly = G . When taking the model to the data, we follow 
earlier studies and characterise the median voter as the voter with median income (see Theorem 
1 in Bergstrom & Goodman (1973)).  
 
3. Data 
The data used in this study has been compiled by Statistics Sweden.
6 Data covers the years 
                                                             
5 A dynamic specification was also used by Becker (1996). She did however use an estimator that yields biased 
and inconsistent results.  
6 Data has, except for the income and grant variables, generously been provided to us by Thomas Aronsson,   7
1981-1987, and contains a number of economic, demographic, and socio-economic variables 
on municipal level. The time period is chosen so that the variable definitions are constant 
throughout the period (there was a change in definitions in 1988), the grant system is 
approximately the same for the whole period (there was a grant reform in 1989), and the 
municipalities were free to set their own taxes for the whole period (there was a tax ceiling 
between 1991 and 1994).  
 
The economic variables used in the empirical analysis are total municipal operating costs net of 
user fees, mean and median household income before tax, tax price and intergovernmental 
grants (which consist of operating grants, investment grants, and grants for tax equalisation), all 
expressed in per capita terms. Since the municipalities in Sweden mainly are responsible for 
such services as day-care, schooling, and care for the elderly, it is important to control for the 
demographic structure in the municipalities. As control variables we use the share of 
inhabitants younger than 16 years of age (Young), the share of inhabitants older than 65 years of 
age (Old)  and the number of inhabitants per square meter (Density). For a summary of the 
variables used in the estimation, see Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Variables used in the estimations. 
Income  Median income + tax price * grants 
Tax price  Median/mean income 
Young  Share of inhabitants younger than 16 
Old  Share of inhabitants older than 65 
Density  Number of inhabitants per square meter 
 
Our balanced panel consists of 266 municipalities, which are observed over the seven years. 
This gives us a total number of 1862 observations. Removed from the sample were 
municipalities that were split, or had missing values for one or more of the key variables. 




4. Econometric Method  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Johan Lundberg and Magnus Wikström at the Department of Economics at Umeå University. 
7 A more detailed description of the data and some summary statistics can be found in the Appendix.   8
In the empirical part of the paper, we will test for exogeneity and dynamics. When we estimate 
a model that has endogenous regressors and/or is dynamic, we cannot use the within estimator 
(see, e.g., Nickell (1981)). In this section we will describe our choice of estimation method for 
the dynamic model derived in equation (2.10).
8 The econometric specification of that model is 
given by 
 
( ) ( ) it i it it it it
m
it t it u f e g y e + + - + G - + G + G + = -1 2 1 0 ln 1 ln ln ln l t t i , (4.1) 
 
where it  is a time-dummy,  fi is an unobserved municipality specific effect, and uit  is the error 
term.  
 
By assumption, uit  satisfies the orthogonality conditions 
 
[ ] ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ] 0 ln ln ln = = = + = it i it is it is is
m
is it is u f E u E u g y E u e E t t , ( ) t s <  (4.2) 
   
 
where an E without subscripts denotes the expectational operator. Nickell (1981) has shown 
that, for models with lagged dependent variables, treating individual effects as constants to be 
estimated or using within transformation yields inconsistent estimates. Following the tradition 
of Anderson & Hsiao (1981), we remove the individual effect by taking first difference of 
equation (4.1). This leaves us with the following equation 
 
( ) ( ) it it it it it
m
it t it u e g y e D + D - + D G - + D G + D = D -1 2 1 ln 1 ln ln ln l t t i , ( ) 1 - < t s (4.3) 
 
where  D denotes the difference operator, (i.e.,  1 ln ln ln - - = D it it it e e e , etc.). The differenced 
residuals satisfy the following orthogonality conditions: 
  
  [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ] 0 ln ln ln = D = D + = D it is it is is
m




Equation (4.3) will be estimated using a GMM estimator exploiting the orthogonality conditions 
in (4.4). 
                                                             
8 This estimator is also applicable when we have a static model with endogenous regressors.   9
 
Doing the above transformation, we have induced a first order MA-process in the residuals and, 
since we have a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side, we must rely on instrumental 
variable techniques. In the GMM context, it is assumed that the following    10
moment-restrictions (in matrix form) are fulfilled 
 
        [ ] [ ] 0 = - XB y Z E ' ,          (4.5) 
 
where 0 is a  1 · J  vector of zeros and X is a stacked vector of all regressors, y is a vector of 
the dependent variable (i.e.,  it e ln D ), Z is the matrix of instruments, and B is the vector of 
parameters. The orthogonality  conditions in (4.4) imply that values of the right hand side-
variables lagged two periods back and more can be used as instruments. The number of 
instruments grows with t, implying that Z is block-diagonal. 
 
The GMM estimation technique is to minimise the loss-function 
 
        [ ] [ ] XB y Z ZW XB y N Q N - - =
- ' '
1 ,      (4.6) 
 
which will be small if the moments are close to being fulfilled.  N W  is a  J J ·  symmetric and 
positive semi-definite weighting matrix, which is needed if the model is over identified, that is, 
if there exist more instruments than parameters to be estimated. Differentiation of (4.6) and 
manipulation of the first order condition yields the following estimator 
 
( ) y Z ZW X X Z ZW X B N N ' ' ' ' ˆ 1 - = .        (4.7) 
 
As proposed by Hansen (1982), we will do the estimation in two steps. In the first step we use 
the weighting matrix proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991), while we in the second allow for 
cross-equation correlation and use the residuals from the first step to form the weighting matrix. 
This estimator is identical to the one proposed and used by Arellano & Bond (1991).
9  
 
The fact that we have an over identified model allows us to conduct a joint test of the model 
specification and the validity of the instruments. The Sargan-statistic (hereafter Q) is formed by 
evaluating the loss-function (4.6) at the estimated parameters from (4.7). Under the null, Q is 
c
2-distributed with degrees of freedom ( Df) equal to the number of instruments minus the 
                                                             
9
 A similar GMM estimator has been developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey & Rosen (1988). The only difference 
between the two estimators is the weighting matrix used in the first step.   11
number of estimated parameters, that is, we have as many degrees of freedom as we have over 
identifying restrictions. An extension of the Sargan-statistic can also be used in tests of more 
specific hypotheses. The difference Sargan ( ds) statistic is formed by estimating both the 
restricted (R) and the unrestricted (U) model and then calculate ds Q Q R U = - . Under the null, ds 
is c
2-distributed with Df Df Df ds Q Q R U = - .
10 
 
5. Results  
In this section we will, first, test the hypothesis of exogenous regressors, and, second, estimate 
a dynamic model and test the hypothesis that there is no sluggishness. If any one or both of these 
hypotheses are rejected, this casts doubt on earlier work on cross sectional data that has 
assumed exogenous regressors.  
 
Testing for exogeneity (static model)  
If there exist some unobserved municipality specific effects that do not vary over time, we 
would like to control for this in the estimations. Performing an F-test, testing the null hypothesis 
that the intercept is identical for all municipalities, we clearly reject the null.
11 This indicates 
that some  unobserved heterogeneity exist in the data. The question is then whether this 
unobserved heterogeneity should be treated as random or fixed effects. Using a Hausman test, 
testing the null of random effects, the null is rejected, a result that indicates that a fixed effect 
estimator must be used.
12 However, the regular fixed effects estimator (in which OLS is 
conducted on deviations from individual time-means) requires that all the independent variables 
are exogenous. Whether this is the case can be tested by means of a Hausman test, testing the 
null of exogenous regressors. Under the null, the fixed effects estimator is consistent and 
efficient, but under the alternative it is inconsistent. The GMM estimator is consistent under 
both the null and the alternative. Carrying out the test, we obtain a test statistic of 942.06 (with 
10 degrees of freedom), which clearly rejects the null. Furthermore, using the ds-statistic and 
testing the regressors separately for exogeneity, it turns out that we have to reject the null of 
exogeneity for all of the explanatory variables.
13 Thus, endogeneity seems to be a serious 
problem, and we will therefore use the GMM estimator discussed in Section 4. 
 
                                                             
10 For derivation of ds, see Arellano & Bond (1991). 
11 F(265, 1591) = 19.743, implying that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level. 
12 The chi-squared statistic is 60.91 with 5 degrees of freedom.    12
                                                                                                                                                                                               
13 This is the case for all models estimated in this paper.   13
Testing for dynamics 
The next step is to test for dynamics. The estimation results for the dynamic model (equation 
(2.13)) are presented in Table 5.1. We can note from the specification tests that we cannot 
reject the validity of the instruments/the model specification in any of the two estimation steps: 
the p-value for the Sargan-statistic is over 0.4 in both cases. Furthermore, we have to reject the 
null of no first order serial correlation (the p -value for AR(1) is 0.0035 in the first-step 
estimates and 0.0085 in the second step), but accept those of higher order (AR(2)-AR(4)) when 
testing at the five percent significance level. This is in accordance with theory. Testing for 
dynamics (i.e., testing whether the lagged dependent variable is significant or not), it turns out 
that it is statistically insignificant in the second-step estimates (GMM2) but significant at the ten 
percent level in the first-step estimates (GMM1). Even though the results don’t give a clear-cut 
answer, there is some indication that it might be important to consider dynamic specifications in 
applied work. Turning to the income- and price elasticities, we note that they are not 
significantly different from plus one and minus one respectively in any of the estimation steps. 
Hence, we cannot reject the null that the observed behaviour is in accordance with the 
maximisation of a Cobb-Douglas utility function in the dynamic specification.    14
Table 5.1 Dynamic specification. 
    GMM1      GMM2   
Variable  Coefficient  SE  T-ratio  Coefficient  SE  T-ratio 
COST (t-1)  0.2410  0.1436  1.6785  0.1252  0.1139  1.0986 
INCOME  0.5932  0.3537  1.6769  0.4699  0.2622  1.7919 
TAXPRICE  -0.7713  0.3615  -2.1336  -0.7431  0.2542  -2.9227 
YOUNG  0.2838  0.0987  2.8750  0.2717  0.0790  3.4372 
OLD  -0.0077  0.1154  -0.0663  -0.0638  0.1000  -0.6377 
DENSITY  -0.4280  0.1298  -3.2963  -0.5375  0.1058  -5.0801 
             
  Specification tests 
Test  Statistic  P-value  Df  Statistic  P-value  Df 
Sargan  38.322  0.4094  37  37.252  0.4575  37 
AR(1)  -2.9214  0.0035    -2.6310  0.0085   
AR(2)  1.7250  0.0845    1.2668  0.2052   
AR(3)  0.0202  0.9839    -0.0125  0.9900   
AR(4)  -0.1634  0.8702    -0.0707  0.9437   
Notes: 
(i) The GMM estimates have been obtained using DPD for Ox 1.20. 
(ii) Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of costs (ln(Costs)). 
(iii) Instruments used are ln(old), ln(young), ln(density), ln(taxprice) and ln(income) lagged one period and 
more, and ln(costs) lagged three periods and more. 
(iv) The estimations include time dummies and a constant. 
(v) AR are the test statistics for first to fourth order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals. The 
null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation of the order in question. 
(vi) Sargan gives the test statistic and p-value of the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. The statistic is 
asymptotically  c
2(p-k) distributed, where p is the number of moment conditions and k is the number of 
coefficients estimated. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid/the model is correctly specified.  
 
Since the presence of dynamics is not fully clear, we also estimate a static specification of the 
log-linear demand function. These results are presented in Table 5.2. In the first step of the 
GMM estimation (GMM1) we have to reject the model specification by means of the Sargan 
test, but moving on to the second step (GMM2) the validity of the instruments/the model 
specification cannot be rejected (the p-value for the Sargan statistic is 0.25). In accordance 
with theory, we have to reject the null of no first order serial correlation (the p-value for AR(1) 
is 0.0002), but accept those of higher order (AR(2)-AR(4)) for the second-step estimates. This 
leads us to rely on the second step estimates.  
 
In the results for GMM2 we find, as for the dynamic specification, that we cannot reject the null 
that the income- and price elasticities are equal to plus one and minus one respectively. The   15
conclusion is that a log-linear specification of the demand function can be used in empirical 
work as long as it is accompanied by appropriate econometric techniques. Looking at the 
parameter estimates for the other variables, we note that YOUNG and DENSITY are significant 
with their expected signs (even though YOUNG is insignificant in the first-stage estimation
14) 
while OLD enters with an unexpected sign but insignificantly so.  
 
Table 5.2 Static specification. 
    GMM1      GMM2   
Variable  Coefficient  SE  T-ratio  Coefficient  SE  T-ratio 
INCOME  0.8272  0.4225  1.9580  0.4496  0.3003  1.4974 
TAXPRICE  -0.9976  0.4533  -2.2008  -0.6708  0.2895  -2.3174 
YOUNG  0.1660  0.1139  1.4572  0.2211  0.0720  3.0722 
OLD  -0.1510  0.1057  -1.4290  -0.1186  0.0784  -1.5119 
DENSITY  -0.6674  0.1470  -4.5397  -0.6480  0.1050  -6.1686 
             
  Specification tests 
Test  Statistic  P-value  Df  Statistic  P-value  Df 
Sargan  62.514  0.0129  40  45.558  0.2519  40 
AR(1)  -3.9060  0.0001    -3.7763  0.0002   
AR(2)  0.4372  0.6619    0.6598  0.5094   
AR(3)  -1.2439  0.2135    -1.4199  0.1556   
AR(4)  0.1320  0.8950    0.3051  0.7603   
Notes: 
(i) Instruments used are ln(old), ln(young), ln(density), and ln(taxprice) and ln(income) lagged one period and 
more, and ln(costs) lagged three periods and more. 
(ii) See further the notes to Table 5.1. 
 
Assuming a static model and exogenous regressors: Fixed effect estimation 
It is of interest to investigate whether the elasticities are significantly different when allowing 
for endogeneity and dynamics compared to the results obtained when these two factors are 
neglected. We will therefore estimate, by means of a fixed effects model, the price- and income 
elasticities in a traditional, static model where the explanatory variables are assumed to be 
exogenous, and compare them with the GMM-estimated elasticities. Since we have found that 
endogeneity, and potentially also lagged spending, must be controlled for, we should not be 
surprised if the results differ from each other. 
                                                             
14 The reason for looking at the estimated standard errors in the first stage is that the estimated standard errors 
in the second stage are downward biased (see, e.g., Arellano & Bond (1991)).   16
 
The results from the fixed effect estimation of the log-linear model are found in table 5.3 (where 
we also, for ease of comparison, present the GMM results). The income- and tax variables 
enter significantly and with expected signs. So does also DENSITY, while YOUNG and OLD 
have unexpected signs (YOUNG significantly so). The interesting point to note is though that the 
price- and income elasticities are significantly higher in the fixed effect estimations than in the 
GMM estimations: the income elasticity is s ignificantly higher at the 5 percent level when 
comparing with the dynamic case and at the 10 percent level when comparing with the static 
case while the price elasticity is significantly higher at the 10 percent level when comparing 
both with the dynamic and the static case. This finding indicates that the price- and income 
elasticities might be upward biased in earlier studies where endogeneity and dynamics have 
been neglected.  
 
Table 5.3 Comparison between the GMM and the fixed effect estimations  
  Income  Taxprice  Young  Old  Density 






























Note: Standard errors within parenthesis. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
Earlier studies estimating the demand for local public services by means of the median voter 
model have typically assumed exogenous regressors and static set-ups. Furthermore, the 
commonly used log-linear specification of the demand function has in most cases not been 
supported by a well-defined maximisation problem. In this paper, we investigate whether 
endogeneity and dynamics are important to control for in empirical work and test the hypothesis 
that observed behaviour can be rationalized by a well-defined maximization problem.  
 
Using a panel of 266 Swedish municipalities over the period 1981-1987, our test results show 
that the regressors are endogenous and that the adjustment process is potentially sluggish. When 
we assume exogenous regressors and a static set-up and estimate the model with the fixed effect 
estimator, we have to reject the hypothesis that observed behaviour can be rationalized by the 
maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function. However, when we control for endogeneity   17
and dynamics, we can no longer reject the constraints imposed on the demand function by the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. Hence, it seems to be valid to use a log-linear specification of 
the demand function as long as appropriate econometric techniques are used.  
 
When comparing our GMM-estimates, in which endogeneity and dynamics are controlled for, to 
those obtained when endogeneity and dynamics are neglected, we get significantly lower price- 
and income elasticities. This result indicates that the estimated elasticities might be upward 
biased in earlier studies where static set-ups and exogenous regressors typically have been 
assumed. 
 
The results in this paper indicate that when estimating demand functions by means of the median 
voter model, one should bear in mind that the explanatory variables might be endogenous 
(calling for some IV-estimator), that dynamics might be important to control for (due to a 
sluggish adjustment process), and that a log-linear specification of the demand function seems to 
be a valid approach (in the sense that we cannot reject the constraints imposed by 
microeconomic theory) when appropriate econometric techniques are used. Of course, t hese 
results might well be a function of the country and time period under study. The general 
recommendation is that these things are tested and, if needed, controlled for in each application. 
If not, the obtained results are likely to be biased. 
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All monetary variables are expressed in 1980 SEK (deflated by the Consumer Price Index). 
 
Municipalities  
The number of m unicipalities included in this data set is 266. Excluded are municipalities that 
have been split or merged during the sample period. Three municipalities (Gotland, Göteborg, 
and Malmö) were excluded because their responsibilities differ from the rest of the sample. 15 
municipalities were excluded due to missing observations. This leaves us with a balanced 
panel of 266 municipalities over 7 years, 1981-1987. 
 
Cost  (eit)  
Total operating costs, net of user fees, expressed in Millions of SEK. 
Mean: 378.1297, st.dev.: 907.5507 
Source: Kommunernas Finanser. 
 
Median income ( yit
m) 
Median household income for inhabitants older than 20 years who are working more than 20 
hours per week. Expressed in thousands of SEK 
Mean:67.53822, st. dev.: 8.205294 
Source: Statistiska Meddelanden, serie Be. 
 
Mean income  
Average household income for inhabitants older than 20 years who are working more than 20 
hours per week. Expressed in thousands of SEK 
Mean: 77.18378, st. dev.: 10.47717 
Source: Statistiska meddelanden, serie Be 
 
Grants (git ) 
Operating grants , investment grants and tax equalisation grants expressed in millions of SEK. 
Mean: 91.80695 st.dev.: 141.2289 
Source: Kommunernas Finanser.   22
 
Tax price (tit) 
Median income / mean income 
Mean: 0.8766739 st. dev.: 0.025636 
Socio-economic and demographic variables (Zit) 
 
Young  
Share of  population younger than 16 years of age. 
Mean: 0.2053734,  st. dev.: 0.026249 
 
Old 
Share of population of age 65 and over. 
Mean: 0.1804379, st. dev.: 0.041458 
 
Density 
Number of inhabitants per square kilometre 
Mean:106.9111, st. dev.: 355.3878 